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Dnipropetrovsk Oblast: new times, old rules
Tomasz Piechal
The war in Donbass and the loss of control over part of the country’s strongly industrialised 
areas resulted in the significance of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast increasing for Ukraine in both 
economic and political terms. This region already accounts for 20% of domestic industrial pro-
duction. The fact that the military operation is taking place in neighbouring areas has turned 
Dnipropetrovsk Oblast into a direct supply base for the Ukrainian army and a migration target 
for many people from the conflict area. Furthermore, the situation in the oblast may serve as 
a good case study illustrating Ukraine’s problems on the regional level four years on from the 
Revolution of Dignity. Despite the unprecedented intensification of patriotic and pro-Ukrain-
ian sentiments in the region, it has been impossible to initiate an overhaul of the elite. 
The old links between politics and business remain intact, politicians linked to the former 
Party of Regions still predominate in local governments, and Dnipropetrovsk Oblast itself re-
mains under the strong influence of local oligarchs. The election of Borys Filatov, a candidate 
of the post-Maidan forces, for the mayor of Dnipro gave rise to strong hopes that the domi-
nance of these circles would be challenged. However, two years since his election, no major 
reform of the government system has been conducted in this city, corruption is still pres-
ent on a broad scale, and the mayor himself has forged alliances with local representatives 
of the ancien régime. As a result, Filatov turned out to be not a pro-European reformer but 
a representative of the old regime who has skilfully adapted himself to the new post-revolu-
tion reality by employing pro-European rhetoric. Similar tendencies can be observed across 
the country but, considering its significance for Ukraine, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast is the most 
interesting region for describing this phenomenon. 
Ukraine’s industry-driving engine
Dnipropetrovsk Oblast is Ukraine’s second larg-
est region in terms of both territory and popula-
tion – its area of 31,900 km2 (around 5% of the 
country’s area) has 3.23 million residents, over 
80% of whom live in large cities (two thirds of 
its population live in the oblast’s five largest cit-
ies: Dnipro, Kryvyi Rih, Kamianske, Nikopol, Pav-
lohrad). In contrast to the neighbouring Donetsk 
Oblast, in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast attachment 
to both the Ukrainian ethnos and language has 
predominated since Ukraine regained independ-
ence. According to data collected during the 
most recent Ukrainian census in 2001, 79.3% 
of the region’s residents perceived themselves 
at that time as Ukrainians (56.9% in Donetsk 
Oblast) and 17.6% as Russians (38.2% in Donetsk 
Oblast). At the same time, the most frequent-
ly used language in the region was Ukrainian 
with 67% of residents viewing it as their first 
language (only 24.1% in Donetsk Oblast). These 
factors turned out to be essential for maintain-
ing stability in the oblast and for the failure of 
the separatism controlled by the Russian secret 
services which broke out in spring 2014. 
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The history of the region’s development is close-
ly linked to the Russian Colonisation of the Wild 
Fields which began along with Empress Cath-
erine’s conquests towards the end of the 18th 
century1. However, the real development boom 
came only one hundred years later, towards the 
end of the 19th century, when rich mineral re-
sources were discovered. The favourable natural 
conditions triggered the region’s development2. 
Already in Soviet times it became one of the key 
industrial regions of the Ukrainian Soviet Social-
ist Republic. A few of the country’s most impor-
tant industrial factories are located in its territo-
ry, for example: Ukraine’s largest metallurgical 
plant ArcelorMittal Kryvyi Rih; one of Ukraine’s 
largest chemical plants DniproAzot; and 
Pivdenmash, a factory operating in the rocket 
and space production sector. Furthermore, the 
fact that the central office of Ukraine’s largest 
bank (PrivatBank) is located in Dnipro makes 
it one of Ukraine’s financial centres. 
In effect, the region is of great importance for 
Ukraine’s economy – in 2015 (the latest availa-
ble data) it accounted for 10.8% of the country’s 
GDP (US$8.92 billion) which made it the sec-
ond largest producer after Kyiv. After Kyiv lost 
1 The region’s main city, Dnipro, was founded in 1787 by 
Empress Catherine (hence its first name: Ekaterinoslav). 
In 1926–2016, it was named Dnipropetrovsk in hon-
our of the communist activist Hryhoriy Petrovsky. Even 
though the city was renamed Dnipro, it is still the capital 
of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast because its name is recorded 
in the constitution of Ukraine. 
2 At present, 100% of the country’s manganese ores, 
100% of its aluminium ores, 90% of the iron ores, 60% 
of the metal ores, more than half of the nickel and co-
balt reserves, 45% of coal deposits, and Ukraine’s largest 
uranium deposits are located in its territory. Data from 
Dnipropetrovsk Oblast State Administration: http://cci.
dp.ua/tl_files/data/content/for%20your%20informa-
tion/2016/eDIALOG_4(25)_2016.pdf 
control of a large section of Donbass’s compa-
nies, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast became Ukraine’s 
second largest exporter (after Kyiv) – in 2016, 
it accounted for 16.1% of goods exports worth 
US$5.86 billion. 
The strongly developed industry and the abun-
dance of natural resources have offered room 
for the development of local groups of interest 
– already in the 1990s, the region’s economic 
potential made it a base for creating local oli-
garchic clans whose representatives still play 
significant roles in the Ukrainian government 
system (for example, Yulia Tymoshenko origi-
nates from Dnipropetrovsk Oblast). Co-owners 
of Privat Group, Ihor Kolomoyskyi and Hen-
nadiy Boholyubov and the owner of Interpipe 
Group, Viktor Pinchuk, have been among the 
top ten richest Ukrainian oligarchs for years. 
At the same time, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast is also 
an object of financial expansion for oligarchs 
based in the neighbouring Donetsk Oblast 
– numerous assets in the region are owned, 
amongst others, by Ukraine’s richest person, 
Rinat Akhmetov3, and Serhiy Taruta, an oligarch 
linked to the Industrial Union of Donbass.
One of the phenomena that accompanied the 
unstable situation in the country at the begin-
ning of 2014 was the attempt made by some 
oligarchs to maintain (and in some cases to 
strengthen) their position on the national fo-
rum. Special efforts in this area were made by 
Ihor Kolomoyskyi, who in March 2014 was nom-
inated governor of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast4 and 
caused the nomination of Ihor Palytsia, who 
was linked to him, for head of Odessa Oblast 
3 Rinat Akhmetov controls, amongst other assets, a num-
ber of the region’s mines and metallurgical plants. Since 
he lost control of part of his companies in Donbass, 
the firms he controls at present have the largest num-
ber of employees precisely in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast: 
https://znaj.ua/news/ahmetov-prylashtuvav-u-vladu-ty-
syachi-svoyi-lyudej-infografika 
4 The nomination of Kolomoyskyi for governor was dic-
tated by the desire to maintain stability in a region bor-
dering on the conflict zone. Both Kolomoyskyi and his 
people – above all his long-term business partners Boris 
Filatov and Hennadiy Korban – made a number of moves 
aimed at neutralising separatist tendencies in the region 
and organised two volunteer battalions (Dnipro-1 and 
Dnipro-2) which took part in clashes in the most danger-
ous sections at the front.
Ihor Kolomoyskyi, Hennadiy Boholyubov 
and Viktor Pinchuk, representatives of 
interest groups based in Dnipropetrovsk 
Oblast, have been among the top ten rich-
est Ukrainian oligarchs for years. 
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State Administration. Kolomoyskyi’s strength-
ening position led to a conflict between him 
and the president which ended not only in Kol-
omoyskyi’s dismissal from this office5 but also 
in the nationalisation of PrivatBank6. However, 
the oligarch managed to maintain significant 
influence in many sectors of the economy, in-
cluding the oil sector. 
The bastion of the old forces
Dnipropetrovsk Oblast is not only an important 
base for major oligarch groups but also a bas-
tion of politicians linked to the former Party of 
Regions. The situation has also not changed af-
ter the Revolution of Dignity – the parliamen-
tary election in 2014 was won in the region by 
the Opposition Bloc (a grouping formed after 
the fall of Viktor Yanukovych by prominent 
politicians from the former Party of Regions) 
which was backed by 24.3% of the electorate. 
The dominant position of this grouping was 
confirmed by local elections in 2015 – politi-
cians from the former Party of Regions became 
mayors in three of the five largest cities of the 
oblast, and the election itself was accompa-
nied by numerous scandals7. At the same time, 
5 For more information on this subject see R. Sadowski, 
‘Kijów próbuje ograniczyć pozycję Kołomojskiego’, OSW 
Analyses, 25 March 2015; https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/
publikacje/analizy/2015-03-25/kijow-probuje-ogran-
iczyc-pozycje-kolomojskiego
6 For more information on this subject see T. Iwański, 
‘Oligarchs making gains: the costly nationalisation of 
Ukraine’s PrivatBank’, OSW Analyses, 21 December 
2016; https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analy-
ses/2016-12-21/oligarchs-making-gains-costly-nationali-
sation-ukraines-privatbank
7 The most widely publicised example was the election 
in Pavlohrad where the main rivals were the Donbass 
war veteran Yevhen Terekhov and Anatoly Vershina 
(Vershina had for many years worked for local law en-
forcement agencies and he is linked to Rinat Akhmetov; 
he also served as a deputy city mayor in 2010–2015). 
Among the supporters of the representative of the an-
cien régime was the Central Election Committee which 
in a scandalous manner made attempts to prevent the 
runoff. Finally, the runoff was held after public protests 
but the candidate of the post-Maidan forces suffered 
a bitter defeat in it: 
https://24tv.ua/skandal_u_pavlogradi_istoriya_vikrad-
ennya_viboriv_odnogo_mista_n625106 
representatives of the Opposition Bloc won 
the largest number of seats in four out of five 
city councils in the region’s largest cities8 and 
won 46 out of 120 seats in the oblast council 
(the largest number among all parties).
The key factor helping the old elite to main-
tain its position has been the lack of a strong 
alternative. New political parties, such as Self 
Reliance, turned out to be too weak to create 
well-developed and effective party structures 
at the local level. Even worse, many of the peo-
ple linked to the new forces became a source 
of numerous controversies9. It was also not un-
usual to transfer old politicians to new politi-
cal projects (especially to the Petro Poroshenko 
Bloc), which brought only an illusory change 
because the same people as before remained 
the decision-makers; the only change being 
the name of their new party. The dependence 
structures built by oligarchs also played an im-
portant role – they are the major employers in 
many cities and they had a significant impact 
on the election result. 
8 In Dnipro, Kryvyi Rih, Kamianske and Pavlohrad. 
In Nikipol, the best election result was achieved by an-
other grouping formed by politicians of the former Party 
of Regions, the Revival party (another political project of 
Ihor Kolomoyskyi). 
9 For example, a deputy of Dnipro city council who was 
elected as a candidate of Self Reliance became the 
object of an investigation conducted by the National 
Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU). The mo-
tion for launching the investigation was brought to 
NABU by representatives of Self Reliance. For more in-
formation on this subject see: https://glavcom.ua/news/
samopomich-vimagaje-vid-nabu-pereviriti-fakti-mozh-
livoji-korupciji-sekretarya-miskradi-dnipra-mishalo-
va-sadoviy--404782.html 
Dnipropetrovsk Oblast has been the bas-
tion of politicians linked to the former Party 
of Regions for years. The situation has not 
changed following the Revolution of Dignity. 
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The failed hopes for change
Dnipro was the only major city in Dnipropetro-
vsk Oblast where a prominent politician from 
the former Party of Regions suffered a defeat 
in the local election in 2015. The struggle for 
the position of the mayor of Dnipro took place 
between Borys Filatov and Oleksandr Vilkul 
(Vilkul had served as the oblast’s governor 
during Yanukovych’s presidency). The uncom-
promising election campaign in which Filatov 
resorted to anti-separatist and pro-Ukrainian 
rhetoric, fiercely attacking politicians linked 
to the Opposition Bloc resulted in his victory. 
Filatov, who garnered only slightly more votes 
than his rival10, would not have been able to win 
the election without the consolidation of sup-
port from local social activists and pro-Ukraini-
an post-Maidan forces. They hoped that Filatov 
would improve the standards of governing the 
city and curb the corruption schemes. 
Only half a year after his election, Filatov formed 
a coalition in the city council whose members 
– apart from representatives of Ukrop (Ukrain-
ian Association of Patriots, one of Ihor Kolo-
moyskyi’s political projects; it backed Filatov in 
the local election) and Self Reliance – included 
seven representatives of the Opposition Bloc 
who, on top of this, were offered senior posi-
tions in the local government. A few months 
later the public were outraged by information 
that Valery Chernobuk, a former judge of the 
Appeals Court of the Autonomous Republic 
of Crimea who had demonstrated an openly 
pro-Russian stance during the Russian annex-
ation of the Crimean Peninsula, was employed 
as an advisor and head of security at the city 
council11. Another scandal was provoked by the 
nomination of the former commander of lo-
cal Berkut, Andrey Tkachenko (who had taken 
part in the pacification of the Maidan protests 
10 Filatov received 184,800 votes, i.e. 26,100 votes more 
than Oleksandr Vilkul. 
11 It finally led to Chernobuk being excluded from the bar 
on charges of lying under oath: https://censor.net.ua/
news/462981/eksglave_apellyatsionnogo_suda_kryma_
otkazali_v_vosstanovlenii_v_doljnosti_gromadske
in Kyiv), for the head of the City Police12. Similar 
decisions outraged local social activists which 
resulted in a series of protests in the city and 
Filatov’s decision to definitely dissociate himself 
from his supporters among social activists and 
non-governmental organisations. In addition 
to the series of controversial nominations in 
Donbass, Dnipro was also the scene of numer-
ous corruption scandals. As a result of financial 
decentralisation, the city increased its budget 
nearly four-fold (from 3 billion hryvnias in 2014 
to 11 billion hryvnias in 2016). It embarked 
upon numerous repairs of municipal buildings, 
roads and urban infrastructure. The repairs of-
fered room for numerous cases of the misuse 
of funds linked to corruption. A consequence of 
meant that sham companies controlled by lo-
cal businessmen and politicians (predominantly 
originating from the Party of Regions) offered 
services at prices higher than reasonable or 
made repairs in such a manner that they had 
to be repeated within a year13. Furthermore, 
pursuant to a decision passed by the city coun-
cil controlled by Filatov, several areas of public 
procurement in the city were excluded from 
ProZorro, a central public procurement system 
established after the Maidan intended at pre-
venting corruption14. In many cases the system 
was bypassed, for example, by breaking one 
12 A structure established by Filatov himself as a municipal 
entity which is not part of Ukraine’s law enforcement 
structures and does not report to the Ministry of Inter-
nal Affairs.
13 The poor quality of infrastructure repairs concerns mainly 
roads. However, one of the most widely publicised scan-
dals concerned the repairs of lifts in buildings which did 
not have them: http://nashigroshi.org/2016/12/06/u-filato-
va-platyat-miljony-za-neisnuyuchi-lifty-shokuyuchi-foto/
14 It was only the compulsory introduction of this system 
on the national level that forced the government to fully 
implement it: https://hromadske.ua/posts/yak-deryba-
nyly-derzhzakupivli-v-dnipri
After two years of his rule, Filatov has 
turned from the ‘hope of the post-Maidan 
forces’ into a typical representative of 
the old system.
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large tender into several smaller ones, meaning 
that the value of a single order did not qualify it 
to be audited under ProZorro. The mayor’s inner 
circle has also been accused of taking over many 
buildings in the city. In effect, after two years of 
his rule, Filatov has turned from the ‘hope of post-
Maidan forces’ into a typical representative of 
the old system, the only difference being his use 
of patriotic and pro-Ukrainian rhetoric. 
Conclusions
The situation in Dnipro itself and in the oblast as 
a whole illustrates the processes that have taken 
place in Ukraine on the local level since the Rev-
olution of Dignity. The stability and the strength 
of the old arrangements turned out to be so sig-
nificant that it has been impossible to replace the 
governing elite or to change the political mecha-
nism. Additionally, the politicians who managed 
to win elections as candidates of parties which po-
sitioned themselves as political post-Maidan and 
pro-Ukrainian movements decided to enter into 
alliances and begin co-operation with represent-
atives of the ancien régime. The government sys-
tem that has been formed during the 26 years of 
Ukraine’s independence turned out to also appeal 
to those who entered it after 2014. In effect, even 
new politicians lack the sufficient will and strength 
to change it because it still enables those who hold 
certain positions to reap gigantic rewards despite 
the fact that anti-corruption institutions have been 
established. Most of the mechanisms designed 
for controlling local government members are too 
weak or insufficient to eliminate the corruption 
present at this level of public administration. 
Taking, for example, only the financial decentral-
isation which was conducted after the Revolu-
tion of Dignity – this has resulted in increasing 
the funds that remain in local budgets, which 
offered the opportunity to significantly increase 
investments in urban infrastructure. This process 
has been noticed by voters who, however, are 
aware of the fact that numerous cases of the 
misuse of public funds linked to corruption take 
place on the occasion of such investments – it 
becomes more important to them that the re-
pairs are made after many years of negligence 
in this area (due to Ukrainian local governments 
having insufficient funds at their disposal). This 
improves the approval ratings of local gov-
ernment members and so many of them have 
a good chance of being re-elected (for example, 
Borys Filatov is currently positively evaluated by 
59% of the residents of Dnipro15). 
Phenomena similar to those seen in Dnipro have 
also been observed in other large Ukrainian cit-
ies. In effect, it is difficult to hope for a systemic 
change of practices which have been rooted at 
the local level for years. Furthermore, the central 
government does not seem to be interested in 
changing the status quo because ensuring loy-
al partners in the regions is a priority for them. 
In exchange for immunity and an informal right 
to misuse budget funds, regional elites are 
obliged to guarantee a good election result to 
political forces linked to the presidential circles, 
which will be of key importance during the pres-
idential and parliamentary elections in 2019.
15 Data taken from surveys conducted by Rating group in late 
September/early October 2017: http://www.iri.org/sites/de-
fault/files/2017-11-28_ukraine_poll_presentation.pdf 
